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Updating, Self-Confidence and Discrimination
1 
 
In a laboratory experiment, we show that subjects incorporate irrelevant group information 
into their evaluations of individuals. Individuals from on average worse performing groups 
receive lower evaluations, even if they are known to perform equally well as individuals from 
better performing groups. Our experiment leaves room neither for statistical nor taste-based 
discrimination. The discrimination we find is rather due to conservatism in updating beliefs. 
This conservatism is more pronounced in females. Furthermore, self-confident male 
evaluators overvalue male performers. Additionally, we use our data to simulate a job 
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1  Introduction 
Consider two individuals who perform equally well. Is their performance evaluated the same way? In a 
laboratory experiment, we find that this is not the case if one individual belongs to a less favorable 
group. “Discrimination” occurs even though the evaluator knows that both individuals perform equally 
well and that hence group belonging is completely irrelevant. Thus, there is no room for statistical 
discrimination. Also, there is no interaction involved between evaluator and performer and hence no 
room for taste-based discrimination. Nevertheless, our laboratory study shows that evaluators take the 
irrelevant group belonging into account. In female evaluators, this effect is even more pronounced. We 
furthermore find self-confident male evaluators to overvalue male performers. 
In our study the information on group belonging is given as the prior (or base-rate information), and the 
information on the individual as the new information. We hence analyze a simple updating problem. In 
the economic and psychological literature on updating, there is broad evidence that people do not 
update according to Bayes’ Rule: Instead, they are either too conservative by giving the prior too much 
weight,
2 or neglect the prior when they should not .
3 Typical updating problems are mathematicall y 
complex: They require reweighting the prior with the new information. In contrast, in our experiment 
Bayes’ Rule just demands to give up the prior completely. Despite the simplicity of the problem subjects 
do not follow Bayes’ Rule. Furthermore, females put more weight on the irrelevant prior than males. 
Such  gender  differences  in  updating  are  in  line  with  findings  from  more  complex  updating  tasks 
(Charness and Levin 2005; Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2006; Dohmen et al. 2009; Möbius et al. 2011). 
Hence, our study shows that gender differences in updating cannot fully be explained by differences in 
mathematical skills.  
We frame the updating problem in two different ways: In one set of treatments we use neutral labels to 
distinguish  the  performers’  groups;  concretely,  we  call  the  groups  “K”  and  “L”.  In  a  second  set  of 
treatments we use gender as the defining property of the two groups: Subjects evaluate either a man or 
an  equally  well  performing  woman.  Evaluators  in  both  frames  update  more  conservatively  than 
rationality  would  prescribe.  Conservatism  in  updating  may  consequently  be  a  potential  source  of 
discrimination observed in the labor market, pertaining not only to gender but to any group with less 
favorable characteristics. We find that self-confidence further adds to discrimination: Self-confident male 
evaluators favor male, but not female performers. 
                                                           
2see e.g. Lyon and Slovic 1976; Bar-Hillel 1980; Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2006; Möbius et al. 2011 
3see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1971; Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Grether 1992; El-Gamal and Grether 1995 3 
 
In the economic literature on labor market discrimination, the focus so far has been on two possible 
rationalizations  of  discriminatory  behavior:  Taste-based  discrimination  (Becker  1957)  assumes  that 
individuals  have  preferences  against  interacting  with  individuals  of  certain  groups  and  therefore 
discriminate them. In contrast, according to the theory of statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 
1973), discriminatory behavior arises due to informational frictions. Neither of these theories can explain 
our  findings:  Taste-based  discrimination  can  be  ruled  out  because  there  is  no  interaction  between 
evaluators and performers. Statistical discrimination does not apply since through our design rational 
beliefs about all performers are identical.
4  
To investigate taste-based discrimination, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) conduct a randomized field 
experiment sending out fictitious resumés to help-wanted ads manipulating race by randomly assigning 
different  names.  They  find  that  Caucasian -sounding  names  receive  fifty   percent  more  call -backs 
compared to African-American-sounding names.  Yet  resumés  do not provide complete   information, 
which makes it difficult to separate between taste-based and statistical discrimination.   Reuben et al. 
(2010) aim at looking beyond both taste-based and statistical discrimination. They find that women are 
less often chosen as leaders than men - even if there are no gender differences in previous performance 
in a competitive real-effort task. However, although prior performance is known, uncertainty about the 
future performance leaves room for statistical discrimination. Furthermore, in their study the chosen 
leader receives money for being chosen, which may provoke taste-based discrimination. In our study, we 
eliminate any possibility of informational frictions and taste-driven behavior since future performance is 
irrelevant and no direct or indirect interaction (e.g.  via payments) between evaluator and p erformer 
occurs. Our paper contributes  to the literature  by showing that even under perfect information  and 
without any interaction with a potentially disliked individual, discrimination may occur. 
We further explore the role of self -confidence in the above setting since we find differences in self -
confidence about own performance  and since previous literature indicates that highly self -confident 
individuals behave differently than individuals with low levels of self-confidence (e.g. Falk, Huffman, and 
Sunde 2006; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). We investigate to what extent the level of self-confidence is 
reflected in how subjects evaluate other subjects’ performances. Our results show that self-confident 
male  evaluators  value  male  performers  more  highly  than  female  performers.  We  infer  that  self-
confidence may be another factor that contributes to discrimination in the labor market. 
                                                           
4 There is a vast empirical literature supporting the existence of discrimination in the labor market. For an overview, 
see Anderson, Fryer and Holt (2006) and Blau and DeVaro (2007). For example, employers might prefer to rely on 
group averages rather than bearing the costs of an interview (Anderson, Fryer, and Holt 2006). 4 
 
We use the results from our study to calibrate a simple model of a job promotion ladder: In each round, 
employees are promoted with probabilities derived from the evaluations made in the laboratory. We 
demonstrate a glass ceiling effect, i.e., there are virtually no females left after few rounds of promotions. 
The effect is stronger when the fraction of promotion decisions made by females is higher. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the design of our experiment. In 
Section 3, we present our results. Section 4 describes our numerical simulations of the glass ceiling 
effect. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2  Design of the Experiment 
The study consists of two separate stages. In the first stage, subjects perform a series of mental rotation 
tasks  (MRTs)  and  are  assigned  to  one  of  two  groups.  Second  stage  subjects  then  evaluate  the 
performance of  a  randomly  assigned  first  stage  subject  from one of  the  two  groups,  who  differ  in 
performance averages. The selection and assignment procedures thereby render prior information on 
the group performance of one of the two groups irrelevant.
5  
First Stage (Pre-Study) 
In the first stage of the study, 91 subjects, called performers, participate (50 female, age range: 17 to 49 
years, mean age: 23.12 years). 24 mental rotation tasks are presented to each subject. Each task consists 
of five pictures of three-dimensional objects, one being the original object, and four being rotated or 
mirrored versions of the original object (adapted from Peters et al. 1995; Vandenberg and Kuse 1978). 
Subjects indicate which two of the four objects were rotated, but not mirrored. They have two times 
three minutes to solve as many as possible of twelve such tasks in each of the two three minute periods. 
Afterwards,  we  ask  subjects  to  estimate  their  own  performance  and  the  average  male  and  female 
performance in the task. Subjects are assured that all data is treated anonymously. Each subject is paid a 
flat amount of EUR 2.00 for participation. An example of the task is provided in Figure 1.  
 
                                                           
5The study was conducted in the Bonn Econ Lab in Bonn, Germany. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 





Figure 1. Example of a mental rotation task presented to the subject. The leftmost object is the original object. 
Subjects have to indicate which two of the four objects (A-D) are rotated but not mirrored versions of the original 
object. In the example, the correct solutions are B and D. 
 
Second Stage (Main Study) 
In the second stage of the study, 305 subjects, called evaluators, participate (153 females, age range: 19-
63 years, mean age: 24.70 years). No subject participating in this part of the study participated in the 
first stage.  
All second stage subjects are informed about the first stage of the study and that they may earn money 
depending on their own decisions and on the performance of a randomly assigned first stage subject.  
We randomly allocate second stage subjects into four treatments: Two neutral treatments, Neutral and 
Selected-Neutral, as well as two gendered treatments, Man and Selected-Woman. For an overview of 
treatments, see Table 1. 
 
   6 
 
Table 1: Treatment overview 
Treatment  Description 
Neutral 
treatments 
Neutral  Evaluators face a randomly drawn performer from group K. 
Selected-Neutral  Evaluators  face  a  performer  from  group  L,  who  is  selected  as 
follows:  
-  A performer from group K is randomly chosen.  
-  If the performer from group K is top, then a performer from 
group L is selected who is also top. 
-  If the performer from group K is mediocre in, a performer 
from group L is selected who is also mediocre. 
Gendered 
treatments 
Man  Evaluators face a randomly drawn male performer. 
  Selected-Woman  Evaluators face a female performer, who is  selected as follows:  
-  A male performer is randomly chosen.  
-  If  the  male  performer  is  top,  then  a  female  performer  is 
selected who is also top. 
-  If  the  male  performer  is  mediocre,  a  female  performer  is 
selected who is also mediocre. 
 
Neutral Treatments 
In both neutral treatments, subjects are informed via pie diagrams how well subjects from two groups, 
called group K and group L, performed in the first stage: One pie diagram shows that 43% of the subjects 
from group K were top, whereas 57% performed in a mediocre way. Another pie diagram shows that 14 
percent  of  the  subjects  from  group  L  were  top,  whereas  86%  were  mediocre.  Subjects  are  further 
informed that “top” means subjects solved more than 13 tasks correctly and “mediocre” means subjects 
solved at least 9 and at most 13 tasks correctly. Second stage subjects do not perform MRTs themselves, 
but are presented the example from Figure 1.  
Selection Process in the Neutral Treatments 
The  selection  process of the  afterwards  assigned  first  stage  performer  is  carefully  described  to  the 
subjects. One first stage subject from group K is drawn randomly. Then, a first stage subject from group L 7 
 
is drawn according to the performance level of the before drawn group K subject. This means that if the 
randomly drawn group K subject is top, then a group L subject is selected who is also top. If the group K 
subject is mediocre, a group L subject is selected who is also mediocre. Subjects are informed that they 
will be randomly assigned to a performer from group K (treatment Neutral) or a selected performer 
from group L (treatment Selected-Neutral). 
The selection procedure provides additional information about the individual that makes the fraction of 
top  performers  in  each  group  completely  irrelevant.  In  other  words,  the  correlation  between  the 
performance of a group K performer and a selected group L performer is exactly one. Second stage 
subjects  should  neglect  the  base  rate  of  43%  versus  14%  top  performers  in  group  K  and  group  L, 
respectively, once they learn about the selection procedure. Our setting is designed to leave no room for 
statistical discrimination between groups and different risk attitudes in different winning probability 
regions, because the probability of facing a top performer is 43% in all treatments. We further eliminate 
foundations for taste-based discrimination, which might arise from a preference for not interacting with 
members of a certain group - either directly or indirectly, e.g. through monetary support. Neither do 
evaluators interact with performers nor does the performance evaluation affect the first stage subjects 
in any sense.  
Evaluation Procedure in the Neutral Treatments 
We elicit the evaluations by letting the second stage subjects face a series of 50 choices between a 
certain outcome and a lottery, varying the certain outcome from EUR 0.40 up to EUR 20.00. The lottery 
outcome  depends  on  the  performance  of  the  first  stage  subject  assigned  to  the  evaluator:  If  the 
performer is top, the evaluator wins the lottery (and receives EUR 20.00). If the performer is mediocre, 
the second stage subject loses the lottery (and receives EUR 0.00). The variable we use is the decision 
where evaluators switch from the risky option to the safe option. Before conducting the choices, subjects 
answer a set of control questions to insure that they understood the experiment. After the random 
assignment to a man or to a selected woman, each subject is asked to make the 50 choices. For the exact 
instructions, the control questions, and the 50 choices, see Appendix 1.  
Gendered Treatments 
The gendered treatments are equal to the neutral treatments, but consider gender as an attribute that 
defines groups. Hence, here group K and group L performers are labeled male and female performers 8 
 
instead. Accordingly, the treatments are named Man and Selected-Woman. The order of the naming of 
the groups is counterbalanced throughout the study.  
After the evaluators made their choices, they are asked to answer a survey. In the survey, evaluators 
should hypothetically estimate their own performance in the MRTs. At the end of the experiment, one of 
the 50 decisions is randomly drawn for payment. 
 
3  Results and Discussion 
We start by presenting summary statistics of the first stage, showing that there are substantially more 
males performing very well in solving MRTs. Then, we analyze the data from the second and main part of 
our  experiment  where  we  investigate  updating  behavior:  We  first  show  that  subjects  are  generally 
conservative, irrationally putting positive weight on the irrelevant prior. Splitting our sample by gender, 
we find that conservatism is more pronounced in females than in males. Then we demonstrate that the 
results essentially carry over from the neutral framing of the updating problem to a gendered one. The 
main difference is that self-confident males are found to strongly overvalue male performers in the 
gendered setting. 
Performance evaluations are stated in amounts of EUR. All analyses are conducted using t-tests. We do 
so because we assume a normal distribution of the data: A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the 
hypothesis  that  evaluations  are  normally  distributed  in  the  sample  (p  >  .05).  We  further  apply  the 




We use our first stage sample to create groups of performers that are later on evaluated by our second-
stage-subjects. We create these groups by determining the percentages of male and female performers 
who solve at least nine and at most thirteen MRTs correctly (mediocre performers), and of male and 
females performers who solve fourteen or more MRTs correctly (top performers). There were 43% male 
                                                           
6Hereby, two null hypotheses about the average treatment effect are tested. The first hypothesis is that evaluating 
a performer in the Selected-Neutral treatment instead of a performer in the Neutral treatment has a zero average 
effect for male and for female evaluators. We hold the same hypothesis concerning the gendered treatments. The 
second hypothesis we test is that the average treatment effect is identical for male and female evaluators, i.e. 
there is no heterogeneity in the average treatment effect. 9 
 
top performers, and accordingly 57% male mediocre performers. Only 14% of female performers were 
top, whereas 86% were mediocre. According to this split, there are significantly more male than female 
top performers (t(43) = 2.29, p = .03). 
Second Stage 
We  define  the  first  decision  where  an  evaluator  switches  from  the  risky  to  the  safe  option  as  the 
switching  point.  33  subjects  switch  between  the  risky  and  the  safe  options  multiple  times  and  are 
therefore excluded from the analyses.
7 Summary statistics of the evaluations across treatments are 
provided in Table A1 in Appendix 2.  
In both frames, neutral and gendered, we find that subjects switch significantly earlier in the Selected -
Neutral and Selected -Woman treatments compared to the Neutral and Man t reatments (neutral 
treatments: t(122) = 3.77, p < .01; gendered treatments: t(125) = 3.24, p < .01). This shows that subjects 
are  too  conservative,  i.e.  they  take  into  account  the  group’s  average  performance  in  the  Selected-
Neutral  and  Selected-Woman  treatments,  although  they  perfectly  know  that  this  information  is 
irrelevant (Figure 2). Since all in the analyses included subjects answered the control questions correctly, 
we assume that subjects know that this information is irrelevant, but are not able to update their beliefs 
accordingly.
8 The effect is significant in the neutral and gender frames, which suggests that conservatism 
in updating is a general phenomenon, and a source of discrimination in the labor market that pertains 
not only to gender but to any group with less favorable average characteristics. Table A 2 in Appendix 2 
provides summary statistics. 
 
                                                           
7As a robustness check we look at average switching points of all evaluators including multiple switchers. The 
results are similar for both measures. Although the proportion of female evaluators, who switch multiple times, is 
significantly higher than among male subjects (t(303) = 3.15, p < .01), there is no gender difference in the average 
switching point among subjects who switch multiple times (t(31) = 1.41, p = 0.17). 
8Only 3 out of 308 subjects did not respond correctly to the 8 control questions and we re excluded from our data 
analyses. See Appendix 1 for the control questions. 10 
 
 
Figure 2. Evaluations in the four treatments. (SE = Standard Error; *p<.05, **p<.01) 
 
Gender Differences in Evaluations between Treatments 
Since there is a general gender difference in evaluations (t(270) = 2.44, p = .02) we further analyze 
evaluations separately for male and female evaluators.  
We start by investigating the general evaluations between the neutral treatments, i.e. the evaluations 
from treatments Neutral and Selected-Neutral. Mean evaluations between these treatments display no 
significant  differences  among  male  evaluators  (t(62)  =  1.31,  p  =  .20).  In  contrast,  we  find  a  highly 
significant  difference  for  female  evaluators  (t(58)  =  4.39,  p  <  .01).  Among  female  evaluators,  the 
evaluation of a randomly drawn subject from group K with the higher overall fraction of top performers 
is, on average, EUR 3.29 higher than the evaluation of the performance of a first stage subject from 
group L with equal performance. Further, the size of the difference in evaluations between the two 
neutral treatments is significantly higher for female compared to male evaluators (t(118) = 2.06, p = .02). 
Hence, female subjects show a more conservative updating behavior than male subjects. An overview of 
differences in mean evaluations is presented in Figure 3 and Table A2 in Appendix 2.
9   
                                                           
9Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix 2 provide coefficients estimated from OLS regressions. The results support the 
findings of the t-tests. In addition, we see that R
2 is .25 in the female regression as compared to only .06 in the male 
regression, which indicates that differences between treatments explain much more of the variation found in 







































**  ** 11 
 
As  in  the  neutral  treatments,  in  the  gendered  treatments  females  evaluate  the  performance  of  a 
selected woman significantly lower than the performance of a randomly drawn man (t(56) = 2.77, p = 
.01).  For  male  evaluators,  the  difference  in  evaluations  between  the  gendered  treatments  is  also  
significant (t(67) = 1.96, p < .05). Although for male subjects this difference is marginally significant in the 
gendered treatments, it is not significantly stronger than in the neutral treatments (t(129) = 0.45, p = 
.33). Also, for female subjects, there is no difference in updating between the gendered and the neutral 
treatments (t(114) = -1.03, p = .15 ).  An overview of differences in mean evaluations is presented in 




Figure 3. Evaluations by gender. (SE = Standard Error; *p<.05, **p<.01) 
 
Our results indicate that women seem to have a general problem with updating, not depending on the 
framing. Instead, they stick to their prior belief based on the average group performance. For males, we 
also  find  an  indication  for  conservatism  in  updating:  The  gendered  framing  seems  to  increase  this 
conservatism.  The  fact  that  males  as  well  as  females  are  conservative  in  the  gendered  treatment 
suggests that conservatism in updating may be a mechanism behind gender discrimination in the labor 
market. 
The Influence of Self-Confidence 
                                                           
10In the regressions in Tables A3 and A4, the dummy variable for the gendered treatments and its interactions with 
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 In line with previous literature (Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2006; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) we find 
that male evaluators are more optimistic about their own (hypothetical) performance in MRTs than 
female evaluators (t(303) = 5.78, p < .01). We therefore investigate the influence of self-confidence on 
discrimination. To measure self-confidence, we take the beliefs about how many MRTs the evaluators 
think  they  would  have  solved  themselves  if  they  had  participated  in  the  first  stage.  Based  on  this 
measure, we construct two groups of evaluators. In the first group, there are evaluators whose beliefs 
about their own hypothetical performance are above the median belief (high self-confidence), and in the 
second group are those with beliefs below the median (low self-confidence), within each treatment and 
gender.  Figure  3  and  Table  A5  in  Appendix 2  provide  the  performance evaluations of second-stage 




                                                           
11As a robustness check, we alternatively use the mean instead of the median for the sample split. We further 
create  two  additional  measures  of  self-confidence:  Firstly,  a  relative  self-confidence  measure  is  constructed 
performing a median-split on the difference between beliefs about the own performance and the performance of 
the corresponding performer. Secondly, we construct a self-confidence measure where we classify subjects as 
being self-confident if, according to their beliefs about their own performance, they would count themselves to the 
group of top performers; i.e. the belief about their own performance is to solve fourteen or more MRTs correctly. 
Results  based  on  these  alternative  self-confidence  measures  lead  to  qualitatively  similar  results  as  the  main 














































Figure 4. Evaluations by level of self-confidence of A) male, and B) female evaluators. (SE = Standard Error; *p<.05, 
**p<.01) 
 
The  results  displayed  in  Figure  4  show  a  clear  pattern  indicating  that  highly  self-confident  male 
evaluators  discriminate  in  the  gendered  treatments  (t(26)  =  3.08,  p  <  .01),  but  not  in  the  neutral 
treatments (t(24) = .87, p = .40). Importantly, the average evaluation of another man’s performance (EUR 
10.56) is well above the expected value of the lottery (EUR 8.60). Hence, highly self-confident male 
evaluators  in  the Man  treatment on  average  lose money  by  switching  to the  save option  too  late. 
Comparing the mean evaluation between treatments, it can be concluded that male subjects with a high 
level  of  self-confidence  overvalue  the  performance  of  other  men  as  opposed  to  undervaluing  the 
performance of a selected woman. Such an effect cannot be observed in the neutral treatments. Male 
subjects with relatively low levels of self-confidence do not show this effect in any of the two pairs of 
treatments (neutral: t(24) = 1.12, p = .28, gendered: t(26) = 0.24, p = .81).
12 Accordingly highly self-
confident men seem to be sensitive to the gender frame, although they know that there are no 
performance differences. In contrast, less self-confident male subjects are not sensitive to this frame.  
This behavior among men may add to the gender discrimination observed in the labor market.  
                                                           
12The estimated coefficients in Tables A9 and A10 confirm this finding. The estimated coefficient of the fourfold 
interaction dummy for highly self-confident male evaluators in the Man treatment is positive and highly significant. 
We can also conclude that  self-confidence is an important omitted  variable  in the  regression of performance 
evaluations by male subjects, as in column 1 of Tables A9 and A10 adding self-confidence improves the fit of the 
regression from an adjusted R
2 of .03 to now .19. Also, the coefficient of the dummy variables for being in a non-





































Self-confidence, female sbubjects 14 
 
Females do not display this pattern. Self-confidence does not seem to play a role when evaluating other 
subjects’ performance (Figure 3).
13  Self-confidence hence seems to be reflected in the behavior of men, 
but not of women. 
 
4   Simulating the Glass Ceiling 
In  this  section  we  investigate  whether  the  (comparatively  small)  differences  in  male  and  female 
evaluation behavior can explain the glass ceiling phenomenon, i.e. the extremely small proportion of 
female employees on higher levels in most job promotion hierarchies. For this purpose we consider a 
simple numerical model of job promotions. 
The Model 
In the model there are t hierarchy levels in a firm with n employees at each hierarchy level. At each level 
there are male and female employees. Employees at level s are split randomly into m groups of size g. 
Each group is assigned a male evaluator with probability ps and a female evaluator otherwise. Males in a 
group with a male evaluator are assigned a random evaluation drawn from the evaluations of males by 
male evaluators in the gendered treatments of our experiment. Females in a group with a male evaluator 
are  assigned  a  random  evaluation  drawn  from  the  evaluations  of  selected  females  made  by  male 
evaluators  in  the  gendered  treatments  of  our  experiment.  Analogously,  evaluations  in  groups  with 
female  evaluators  are  drawn  from  the  evaluations  made  by  female  evaluators  in  the  gendered 
treatments. 
In each group, the group member with the highest evaluation is promoted to the next hierarchy level. 
The number of female employees at level s+1 is determined by the number of females promoted at level 
s. We consider an (approximate) steady state, i.e., we choose the proportion ps of female evaluators at 
level s approximately equal to the proportion of females promoted from level s to level s+1. This fixed 
point is determined by a simple iterative algorithm.
14 We close the model by assuming that at the lowest 
hierarchy level there are equally many female and male employees. 
                                                           
13Accordingly, adding self-confidence only slightly increases the adjusted R
2 from .19 to .23. It does not affect the 
significance of any estimated coefficient. 
14We start with arbitrary proportions of female evaluators (e.g., no female evaluators) and calculate the number of 
promoted females. These resulting proportions are used as the new proportions of female evaluators. The 
procedure is iterated until proportions do not change significantly anymore. 15 
 
Due  to  the  asymmetry  between  evaluations of  males  and  selected  females  in  our  experiment,  this 
promotion dynamics can be thought of as a model of promotions in a job which is traditionally male-
dominated. Recall also that the evaluations we collected were all on ex-ante equally-skilled subjects. 
Thus,  we  model  promotions  of  equally-skilled  and  equally-sized  male  and  female  populations  in  a 
traditionally male-dominated employment fields. In order to minimize the contribution of stochastic 
fluctuations,  we  average  over  z  runs  of  these  dynamics  and  choose  a  number  of  employees  n  of 
sufficient size.
15 Considering an approximate steady state is justified by the fact that it is usually reached 
after about three iterations of the procedure described in Footnote 14. 
Results 
Table 2 depicts the approximate steady state proportions of females for different values of g and for 6 
hierarchy levels and thus 5 promotions.
16 
 
Table 2: Approximate steady states for 6 hierarchy levels 
0.500  0.416  0.339  0.273  0.216  0.169   g=2 
0.500  0.380  0.277  0.194  0.132  0.090   g=4 
0.500  0.353  0.230  0.141  0.082  0.045   g=6 
0.500  0.332  0.189  0.095  0.045  0.019   g=8 
 
As could be expected from our experimental results, we see a moderate decrease in the proportion of 
females from one hierarchy level to the next. These decreases result in a tiny proportion of females after 
four  or  five  rounds  of  promotions.  Therefore,  the discrimination  driven  effects  we observed  in our 
experiment are strong enough quantitatively to explain a glass ceiling effect. For smaller values of g, i.e. 
when each promoted employee is only compared to few opponents, the decrease in the proportion of 
females becomes smaller in each step. This could be interpreted as the situation in a relatively hierarchic 
company. Note however that this does not correspond to a better situation for females since each 
                                                           
15This implies that the actual size of n is irrelevant as long as n and z are sufficiently large. Notably, we could as well 
consider a promotion pyramid where higher hierarchies are smaller than lower ones. The advantage of equally-
sized levels is that computational effort is spread equally across levels. 
16The further parameters are n=2400 and z=400. 16 
 
promotion carries less meaning in such a setting. In fact, if we compare, e.g. two rounds of promotions 
for g=4 to one round for g=8, we see an even stronger decrease. 
We conclude our numerical investigation by comparing our steady state results with two extreme cases, 
the cases where all promotion decisions are made, respectively, by males or by females. The results for 
g=4 are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of steady state results with two extreme cases (g=4) 
0.500  0.380  0.277  0.194  0.132  0.090  steady state 
0.500  0.340  0.208  0.119  0.066  0.034  all female 
0.500  0.403  0.311  0.231  0.166  0.115  all male 
 
While all three cases are qualitatively similar
17, we see that the decrease in the number of female 
employees when moving up the hierarchy is most pronounced when all promotion decisions are made 
by females. In contrast, the proportion of females falls considerably slower than in the steady state, 
when all promotion decisions are made by males. This shows that the comparatively strong initial 
decrease in the proportion of females seen in Table 2 is driven significantly by the promotion decisions of 
females at intermediate hierarchy levels. This is in line with previous literature investigating the gender 
composition of evaluation committees (Blau and DeVaro 2007; Bagues and Esteve-Volart 2010). 
 
5  Conclusion 
This study shows that conservatism in updating erroneous beliefs is a potential source of discrimination, 
beyond taste-based and statistical discrimination. We investigate whether individuals are able to fully 
give up their prior belief concerning groups with known average performances in favor of new individual-
specific  information.  We  consider  the  simple  case  where  the  signal  about  the  performance  of  the 
individual is perfect. 
First, this study uncovers that females stick too much to the irrelevant prior regarding group belonging 
when  evaluating  an  individual’s  performance.  Not  updating  their  erroneous  beliefs  leads  to 
                                                           
17This qualitative similarity is also a robustness check for our fixed-point procedure. 17 
 
discrimination against individuals who belong to a group known to have a less favorable performance 
average. Hence, discrimination may persist even if evaluators have perfect signals concerning individual’s 
performance. This discriminatory behavior seems to be general and not pertaining to a particular frame, 
i.e. gender. Men do not display the same general pattern.  
Second, we show that men also tend to stick to their irrelevant priors regarding group belonging when 
gender is introduced as a group label. Furthermore, male subjects with high self-confidence about their 
own performance overrate the performance of other men. In line with psychological research on “the 
false consensus effect”, our results may be caused by men projecting their own self-confidence on other 
men. The false consensus effect states that individuals overestimate the extent to which others have 
similar beliefs, opinions, preferences and habits as they themselves have (e.g. Ross, Greene, and House 
1977; Bauman and Geher 2002).  Men might consider themselves more similar to other men than to 
women, and accordingly project their own self-confidence on other men. 
Our simulations explore the consequences of our findings in a labor market setting. We show that the 
discrimination we observe adds up to a glass ceiling effect, i.e. to the virtual absence of women after few 
rounds of promotions. In line with empirical observations, this effect is even more pronounced when 
more promotion decisions are made by women.  
This study considers a benchmark case, where the signal about the performance of a person is perfect. 
For future research it would be interesting to explore conservatism as a possible source of discrimination 
in other settings, notably, in the field, where signals are less perfect. It would also be interesting to 
investigate how much better an individual from certain groups, with less favorable characteristics, must 
perform in order to receive the same evaluation as others.  
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SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR GENDER TREATMENT (“SELECTED-WOMAN”): 
Welcome to our study. Please read the following instructions carefully.  
For  participating  in  this  study  you  will  receive  4  EUR  for  sure.  Depending  on  you  and  another 
participant’s  performance  you  can  earn  money  in  addition  to  these  4  EUR.  In  this  study  you  are 
anonymous and all data that you provide will be treated confidentially. If you have any questions after 
reading the following instructions, please raise your hand and we will come to answer your question. 
Please do not talk to other participants during the study – we would have to exclude you from this study 
then. 
The study consists of two stages: You are a second stage participant. During the study, you will be 
randomly assigned to a participant who participated in the first stage. 
Stage 1 
This stage has already been completed by other participants. Those participants solved a number of mental 
rotation tasks. Here is an example for this task:  
 
In this stage subjects had to distinguish between the two figures among A, B, C, and D that can be 
transferred into the original object on the left side by rotation (in our example figures B and D). The two 
other figures (in our example figures A and C)  that cannot be transferred into the original object by 
rotation only, but had to be mirrored. Subjects were supposed to cross out the two figures that were 
rotations only. If they crossed out both correct figures, the task was solved correctly. Subjects were given 
24 of these tasks, and 6 minutes to solve as many of them as possible. 
Stage 2 
In this stage you are the sole decision maker. You have the opportunity to earn money depending on the 
stage 1 performance of a first stage participant you have been randomly matched with. The payment is for 
you only, the first stage participant was paid for his participation already. 
                                                           
18 The following are an English version of instructions for the treatments “Selected-Woman” and “Neutral”. The 
original German versions are available from the authors upon request. 22 
 
In the following, we only regarded participants of the first stage who solved a minimum number of tasks 
correctly. participants were divided into two groups, males and females. 
-  43% of the male participants are top perfomers. 57% are mediocre performers. 
-  14% of the female participants are top perfomers. 86% are mediocre performers. 
 
Top performers are participants who solved 14 or more tasks correctly, whereas mediocre performers are 
participants who solved at least 9 tasks correctly, but not more than 13 tasks. 
 
 















Please answer the following control questions: 
1.  Imagine  that  there  were  100  male  participants  in  Stage  1.  What  is  the  number  of  male  top 
performers?_____ participants are top performers. 
2.  Imagine  that  there  were  100  female  participants  in  Stage  1.  What  is  the  number  of  female  top 
performers?_____ participants are top performers. 
3.  Imagine  that  there  were  100  male  participants in  Stage  1.  What  is the  number  of  male  mediocre 
performers?_____ participants are mediocre performers. 23 
 
4. Imagine that there were 100 female participants in Stage 1. What is the number of female mediocre 
performers?_____ participants are mediocre performers. 
 
The selection of the female and male participants: 
Please read the following paragraph carefully. It is important that you understand the selection 
process. 
The selection of the first stage participants was as follows: 
We randomly select one male participant. We call him participant M henceforth. Then we will select a 
female participant F as follows:  
-  If  participant  M  was  a  top  performer,  we  select  a  female  participant  F  who  also  was  a  top 
performer.  
-  If participant M was a mediocre performer, we choose a female participant F who also was a 
mediocre performer.  
 
You will get matched either to the male particioant M or the female participant F.  
 
Later, you will choose between a fixed reward and a lottery: 
 
-  You receive 20 EUR if the participant you are matched with is a top performer 
-  You receive 0 EURif the participant is a mediocre performer 
 
Please answer the following control questions: 
Imagine that one male and one female participant are selected as it is described above. Please indicate by 
putting an X which alternative you think is correct in the following two situations. 
1. If the male participant participant is a top performer, then the female participant is a 
___ top performer  ____ mediocre performer  ___ could be either or 
2. If the male participant is a mediocre performer, then the female participant is a 
___ top performer  ____ mediocre performer  ___ could be either or 
Please insert the correct answer in the following two situations. 
1. If the person you got matched to is a top performer, you receive _____ EUR. 





We now ask you to make a decision for each of the following options between getting a fixed amount of 
money(from 0.40 EUR going up to 20 EUR), and playing the aforementioned lottery. 
At the end, one of your decisions will be randomly drawn and determine your final payoff.  
Mark your answers by putting an X at the alternative you choose for each of the questions 1 to 50. 
1.  When a decision will be drawn in which you chose the fixed reward, you will receive this reward. 
2.  When a decision will be drawn in which you chose the lottery, you will receive 0 or 20 EUR, 
depending on the performance of your matched first stage participant. 
3.  If you do not put an X in the decision that was drawn, you will receive 0 EUR. 
 
According to selection process described above, you have been matched with a female participant. 
Making these decisions we ask you to take your time to think about your decisions and to take them 
seriously.  Also,  remember  that  you  will  be  paid  according  to  one  of  these  decisions,  which  is 
randomly drawn after the study ends.  
1) Which alternative do you choose: 
0.40 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
female participant 
2) Which alternative do you choose: 
0.80 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
female participant 
3) Which alternative do you choose: 
1.20 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
female participant 
….. 
50) Which alternative do you choose: 
20.00 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
female participant 25 
 
SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEUTRAL TREATMENT (“NEUTRAL”): 
Welcome to our study. Please read the following instructions carefully.  
For  participating  in  this  study  you  will  receive  4  EUR  for  sure.  Depending  on  you  and  another 
participant’s  performance  you  can  earn  money  in  addition  to  these  4  EUR.  In  this  study  you  are 
anonymous and all data that you provide will be treated confidentially. If you have any questions after 
reading the following instructions, please raise your hand and we will come to answer your question. 
Please do not talk to other participants during the study – we would have to exclude you from this study 
then. 
The study consists of two stages: You are a second stage participant. During the study, you will be 
randomly assigned to a participant who participated in the first stage. 
Stage 1 
This stage has already been completed by other participants. Those participants solved a number of mental 
rotation tasks. Here is an example for this task:  
 
In this stage subjects had to distinguish between the two figures among A, B, C, and D that can be 
transferred into the original object on the left side by rotation (in our example figures B and D). The two 
other figures (in our example figures A and C)  that cannot be transferred into the original object by 
rotation only, but had to be mirrored. Subjects were supposed to cross out the two figures that were 
rotations only. If they crossed out both correct figures, the task was solved correctly. Subjects were given 
24 of these tasks, and 6 minutes to solve as many of them as possible. 
Stage 2 
In this stage you are the sole decision maker. You have the opportunity to earn money depending on the 
stage 1 performance of a first stage participant you have been randomly matched with. The payment is for 
you only, the first stage participant was paid for his participation already. 
In the following, we only regarded participants of the first stage who solved a minimum number of tasks 
correctly. participants were divided into two groups, K and L. 
-  43% participants of group K are top perfomers. 57% are mediocre performers. 
-  14% participants of group L are top perfomers. 86% are mediocre performers. 
 
Top performers are participants who solved 14 or more tasks correctly, whereas mediocre performers are 



















Please answer the following control questions: 
1. Imagine that there were 100 participants in group K in Stage 1. What is the number of group K top 
performers?_____ participants are top performers. 
2. Imagine that there were 100 participants in group L in Stage 1. What is the number of group L top 
performers?_____ participants are top performers. 
3.  Imagine that there were 100 participants in group K  in Stage 1. What is the number of  group K 
mediocre performers?_____ participants are mediocre performers. 
4. Imagine that there were 100 participants in group L in Stage 1. What is the number of group L mediocre 





The selection of the participants from group K and L: 
Please read the following paragraph carefully. It is important that you understand the selection 
process. 
The selection of the first stage participants was as follows: 
We randomly select one participant from group K. We call him participant k henceforth. Then we will 
select a participant L as follows:  
-  If participant K was a top performer, we select a participant L who also was a top performer.  
-  If participant K was a mediocre performer, we choose a participant L who also was a mediocre 
performer.  
 
You will get matched either to the male participant K or participant L.  
 
Later, you will choose between a fixed reward and a lottery: 
 
-  You receive 20 EUR if the participant you are matched with is a top performer 
-  You receive 0 EUR if the participant is a mediocre performer 
 
Please answer the following control questions: 
Imagine that one participant K and one participant L are selected as it is described above. Please indicate 
by putting an X which alternative you think is correct in the following two situations. 
1. If participant K is a top performer, then participant L is a 
___ top performer  ____ mediocre performer  ___ could be either or 
2. If participant K is a mediocre performer, then participant L is a 
___ top performer  ____ mediocre performer  ___ could be either or 
Please insert the correct answer in the following two situations. 
1. If the person you got matched to is a top performer, you receive _____ EUR. 
2. If the person you got matched to is a mediocre performer, you receive _____ EUR. 
Decision 
We now ask you to make a decision for each of the following options between getting a fixed amount of 
money (from 0.40 EUR going up to 20 EUR), and playing the aforementioned lottery. 
At the end, one of your decisions will be randomly drawn and determine your final payoff.  
Mark your answers by putting an X at the alternative you choose for each of the questions 1 to 50. 
4.  When a decision will be drawn in which you chose the fixed reward, you will receive this reward. 28 
 
5.  When a decision will be drawn in which you chose the lottery, you will receive 0 or 20 EUR, 
depending on the performance of your matched first stage participant. 
6.  If you do not put an X in the decision that was drawn, you will receive 0 EUR. 
 
According to selection process described above, you have been matched with a participant from 
group K. 
Making these decisions we ask you to take your time to think about your decisions and to take them 
seriously.  Also,  remember  that  you  will  be  paid  according  to  one  of  these  decisions,  which  is 
randomly drawn after the study ends.  
1) Which alternative do you choose: 
0.40 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
participant 
2) Which alternative do you choose: 
0.80 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
participant 
3) Which alternative do you choose: 
1.20 EUR for sure    0  or  20  EUR  depending  on  the  performance  of  your 
participant 
….. 
50) Which alternative do you choose: 






Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Evaluators 
 
Subjects  All  Male  Female  Gender 
   
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  difference 
Variable  (Std.dev.)  Obs.  (Std.dev.)  Obs.  (Std.dev.)  Obs.  in means 
   
                   
First switching point  6.84  6.8  7.28  7.60  6.35  5.60  0.93** 
  in EUR 
a)  (3.18)  272  (3.14)  144  (3.16)  128  [0.02] 
Av. switiching point  6.98  6.8  7.39  7.60  6.57  6.00  0.82** 
  in EUR  (3.18)  305  (3.17)  152  (3.14)  153  [0.02] 
Multiple switcher  0.11  0  0.05  0  0.16  0  -0.11** 
  (dummy)  (0.31)  305  (0.22)  152  (0.37)  153  [0.00] 
                 
Belief:  14.00  14.0  15.36  16  12.64  12  2.72** 
  Own score  (4.32)  305  (4.17)  152  (4.05)  153  [0.00] 
Belief:  13.17  14.0  13.36  14  12.99  14  0.37 
  Participant's score  (3.11)  305  (3.25)  152  (2.97)  153  [0.30] 
Diff. in beliefs:  0.83  0.0  2.01  2  -0.35  0  2.36** 
  Own - participant  (4.24)  305  (3.80)  152  (4.34)  153  [0.00] 
                 
Belief:  14.16  14.0  13.92  13  14.41  14  -0.49 
  Av.male score  (2.92)  305  (2.99)  152  (2.83)  153  [0.15] 
Belief:  10.87  10.0  10.97  11  10.77  10  0.20 
  Av.female score  (2.87)  305  (2.99)  152  (2.74)  153  [0.55] 
                 
Task usefulness  6.52  7.0  6.64  7  6.41  7  0.23 
  (1 = low to 10 = high)  (2.33)  305  (2.35)  152  (2.31)  153  [0.37] 
                 
Age  24.70  24.0  25.36  25  24.04  24  1.32** 
    (4.59)  305  (5.27)  152  (3.69)  153  [0.01] 
      
 
              
                          
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level (two-sided t test).       
a: When considering the first switching point, subjects with more than one switching point are excluded in all tables. 
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Table A2: Performance Evaluations 
Treatment   
First switching point in EUR  Average switching point in EUR 
   Subjects  All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
   
  
 
    
 
 
Man  Mean  7.97  8.37  7.49  7.86  8.30  7.42 
 
(Std.err.)  (0.46)  (0.70)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (0.67)  (0.49) 
 
Median  7.6  8.0  6.8  7.6  8.0  7.2 
 
Obs.  42  23  19  48  24  24 
   
             
Selected  Mean  6.13  6.82  5.32  6.32  7.11  5.47 
woman  (Std.err.)  (0.33)  (0.43)  (0.47)  (0.32)  (0.46)  (0.43) 
 
Median  5.6  7.2  4.8  5.6  7.6  4.8 
 
Obs.  85  46  39  94  49  45 
   
             





**[.01]  1.19 [.14]  1.95
**[.01] 
Zero ATE 
b)     χ
2(2) = 12.16 [.00]
**     χ
2(2) = 11.16 [.00]
** 
Constant ATE 
b)     χ
2(1) =   0.32 [.57]     χ
2(1) =   0.53 [.46] 
   
             
                       
Neutral  Mean  8.32  8.07  8.55  8.29  8.04  8.51 
 
(Std.err.)  (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.59)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (0.53) 
 
Median  8.2  7.8  8.4  8.2  7.8  8.4 
 
Obs.  62  30  32  70  32  38 
   
             
Neutral  Mean  6.23  7.02  5.26  6.51  7.07  5.93 
selected  (Std.err.)  (0.43)  (0.66)  (0.44)  (0.41)  (0.64)  (0.49) 
 
Median  5.6  6.8  5.0  6.0  6.8  5.6 
 
Obs.  62  34  28  69  35  34 
                       
Difference in means 
a)  2.09
**[.00]  1.05 [.20]  3.29
**[.00]  1.78
**[.00]  0.97 [.22]  2.58
**[.00] 
Zero ATE 
b)     χ
2(2) = 22.07 [.00]
**     χ
2(2) = 14.46 [.00]
** 
Constant ATE 
b)     χ
2(1) =   4.48 [.03]
**     χ
2(1) =   2.39 [.12] 
                       
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level. p-values in brackets. 
a: Two-sided t test.     
b: Tests for treatment effect heterogeneity as in Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2008). The first (second) is testing 
    whether facing a selected person has a zero (an identical) average effect for male and female subjects. 
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Table A3: Regression Analysis of Performance Evaluations by Gender 
  Switching Point 
Subjects  Male  Female  All 
Non-select TM * Gender TM * Male      1.61 
(1.52) 
Non-select TM * Male      -2.24** 
(1.02) 
Gender TM * Male      -.26 
(.99) 






Male      1.75** 
(.74) 
























Obs.  133  118  251 
R squared  .06  .25  .14 
Estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). Non-select TM 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the treatments Man and Neutral, and zero otherwise. Gender TM is a dummy that equals one 
for the gendered treatments Man and Selected-Woman. 
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Table A4: Regression Analysis of Performance Evaluations by Gender 
  Average Switching Point 
Subjects:  Male  Female  All 
Non-select TM * Gender TM * Male      .86 
(1.47) 
Non-select TM * Male      -1.62 
(1.00) 
Gender TM * Male      .49 
(.99) 






Male      1.15 
(.71) 
























Obs.  140  141  281 
R squared  .04  .20  .11 
Estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). Non-select TM 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the treatments Man and Neutral, and zero otherwise. Gender TM is a dummy that equals one 
for the gendered treatments Man and Selected-Woman. 
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Table A5: Performance Evaluations by Relative Level of Self-Confidence 
                             
    First switching point in EUR  Average switching point in EUR 




c)  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low 
                        
Man  Mean  10.56  5.80  7.75  7.65  10.56  5.91  7.38  7.71 
  (Std.err.)  (0.94)  (0.68)  (0.70)  (1.17)  (0.94)  (0.61)  (0.72)  (0.88) 
  Median  9.6  5.6  8.4  6.8  9.6  5.6  8.0  6.8 
  Obs.  10  8  8  8  10  9  9  11 
                        
Selected-  Mean  7.27  6.08  5.72  5.18  7.27  6.38  6.13  5.18 
Woman  (Std.err.)  (0.60)  (0.68)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.60)  (0.65)  (0.73)  (0.65) 
  Median  7.8  5.6  4.8  4.4  7.8  6.4  5.6  4.2 
  Obs.  18  20  13  18  18  22  15  22 
                        
Difference in means 
a)  3.29**  -0.28  2.03*  2.47*  3.29**  -0.47  1.25  2.53** 
  [p-value]  [.00]  [.81]  [.09]  [.08]  [.00]  [.67]  [.27]  [.03] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=8.69[.01]**  χ
2(2)=6.95[.03]**  χ






2(1)=6.90 [.01]**  χ
2(1)=0.73[.39] 
                        
                             
Neutral   Mean  7.65  8.62  9.6  8.24  7.65  8.80  9.46  8.31 
  (Std.err.)  (0.55)  (0.63)  (0.94)  (0.73)  (0.55)  (0.60)  (0.82)  (0.70) 
  Median  7.6  8.4  9.6  8.4  7.6  8.4  9.6  8.4 
  Obs.  15  11  12  15  15  12  14  18 
                        
Selected-
Neutral  Mean  7.02  6.99  6.08  4.77  7.02  7.10  6.62  5.34 
  (Std.err.)  (0.42)  (1.16)  (0.65)  (0.76)  (0.42)  (1.09)  (0.75)  (0.79) 
  Median  7.6  7.6  6.4  4.2  7.6  7.6  6.8  4.6 
  Obs.  11  15  10  12  11  16  13  14 
                             
Difference in means 
a)  0.63  1.63  3.52**  3.47**  0.63  1.70  2.84**  2.97** 
  [p-value]  [.40]  [.28]  [.01]  [.00]  [.40]  [.22]  [.02]  [.01] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=2.37 [.31]  χ
2(2)=20.3[.00]**  χ




2(1)=0.45 [.50]  χ
2(1)=0.00[.98]  χ
2(1)=0.56 [.46]  χ
2(1)=0.01[.93] 
                             
                   
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level. p-values in brackets. 
a: Two-sided t test.       
b: Tests for treatment effect heterogeneity as in Crump et al. (2008). The first (second) is testing whether 
facing a selected person has a zero (an identical) average effect for highly and less self-confident subjects.     
c: Self-confidence is high (low) if the belief about own score is above (below) the median belief by gender. 
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Table A6: Performance Evaluations by Relative Level of Self-Confidence (Robustness Check) 
                             
    First switching point in EUR  Average switching point in EUR 




c)  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low 
                       
Man  Mean  10.56  6.68  7.38  7.65  10.56  6.69  7.17  7.71 
  (Std.err.)  (0.94)  (0.72)  (0.57)  (1.17)  (0.94)  (0.66)  (0.53)  (0.88) 
  Median  9.6  6.0  7.6  6.8  9.6  6.4  7.6  6.8 
  Obs.  10  13  11  8  10  14  13  11 
                   
Selected-  Mean  7.38  6.08  5.45  5.18  7.7  6.38  5.74  5.18 
Woman  (Std.err.)  (0.55)  (0.68)  (0.60)  (0.76)  (0.62)  (0.65)  (0.59)  (0.65) 
  Median  8.0  5.6  4.8  4.4  8.0  6.4  4.8  4.2 
  Obs.  26  20  21  18  27  22  23  22 
                   
Difference in means 
a)  3.18**  0.6  1.93**  2.47*  2.86**  0.31  1.43  2.53** 
  [p-value]  [.01]  [.56]  [.05]  [.08]  [.02]  [.76]  [.11]  [.03] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=8.89[.01]**  χ
2(2)=8.65 [.01]**  χ





2(1)=0.11 [.74]  χ
2(1)=3.06 [.08]*  χ
2(1)=0.67 [.41] 
                   
                     
Neutral   Mean  7.65  8.48  8.82  8.24  7.65  8.38  8.68  8.31 
  (Std.err.)  (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.91)  (0.73)  (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.79)  (0.70) 
  Median  7.6  8.4  9.6  8.4  7.6  8.4  9.0  8.4 
  Obs.  15  15  17  15  15  17  20  18 




Mean  7.03  7.02  6.08  4.80  7.03  7.14  6.62  5.50 
  (Std.err.)  (0.73)  (1.31)  (0.65)  (0.56)  (0.73)  (1.22)  (0.75)  (0.64) 
  Median  6.0  7.6  6.4  4.6  6.0  7.6  6.8  4.8 
  Obs.  21  13  10  18  21  14  13  21 
                     
Difference in means 
a)  0.62  1.46  2.74**  3.44**  0.62  1.24  2.06*  2.81** 
  [p-value]  [.53]  [.29]  [.04]  [.00]  [.53]  [.34]  [.08]  [.01] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=1.54 [.46]  χ
2(2)=19.9[.00]**  χ




2(1)=0.25 [.62]  χ
2(1)=0.23[.63]  χ
2(1)=0.14 [.71]  χ
2(1)=0.26[.61] 
                             
                   
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level. p-values in brackets. 
a: Two-sided t test.       
b: Tests for treatment effect heterogeneity as in Crump et al. (2008). The first (second) is testing whether facing a selected person has a zero 
(an identical) average effect for highly and less self-confident subjects. 
c: Self-confidence is high (low) if the belief about own score is above (below) the mean belief by gender.   
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Table A7: Performance Evaluations by Beliefs About Own Relative Performance (Robustness Check) 
                             
    First switching point in EUR  Average switching point in EUR 




c)  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low 
                        
Man  Mean  10.28  6.89  7.69  7.32  10.28  6.89  7.5  7.33 
  (Std.err.)  (1.00)  (0.76)  (0.61)  (0.97)  (1.00)  (0.71)  (0.54)  (0.83) 
  Median  9.2  6.0  8.0  6.8  9.2  6.4  7.8  6.8 
  Obs.  10  13  9  10  10  14  12  12 
                        
Selected-  Mean  6.51  7.18  4.89  5.70  6.88  7.37  5.03  5.78 
Woman  (Std.err.)  (0.53)  (0.73)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.68)  (0.67)  (0.57) 
  Median  6  8.0  3.8  4.8  6.4  8.0  4.0  4.8 
  Obs.  25  21  18  21  26  23  19  26 
                        
Difference in means 
a)  3.77**  -0.29  2.80**  1.62  3.40**  -0.48  2.47**  1.55 











2(1)=6.49 [.01]**  χ
2(1)=0.48[.49] 
                        
                             
Neutral   Mean  7.40  8.65  9.67  7.11  7.20  8.78  9.41  7.39 
  (Std.err.)  (0.61)  (0.48)  (0.66)  (0.93)  (0.60)  (0.47)  (0.60)  (0.86) 
  Median  7.6  8.2  9.6  6.4  7.6  8.4  9.6  6.8 
  Obs.  14  16  18  14  15  17  21  17 
                        
Selected-
Neutral  Mean  6.02  8.02  5.06  5.46  6.02  8.07  5.65  6.21 
  (Std.err.)  (0.51)  (1.19)  (0.62)  (0.64)  (0.51)  (1.12)  (0.70)  (0.70) 
  Median  5.6  7.6  5.4  4.8  5.6  7.6  5.6  5.6 
  Obs.  17  17  14  14  17  18  17  17 
                             
Difference in means 
a)  1.38*  0.63  4.61**  1.65  1.18  0.71  3.76**  1.18 
  [p-value]  [.09]  [.64]  [.00]  [.15]  [.15]  [.57]  [.00]  [.30] 
Zero ATE 
b)  χ
2(2)=3.21 [.20]  χ
2(2)=27.9[.00]**  χ




2(1)=0.25 [.62]  χ
2(1)=4.19[.04]**  χ
2(1)=0.10 [.75]  χ
2(1)=3.23[.07]* 
                             
                   
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level. p-values in brackets. 
a: Two-sided t test.       
b: Tests for treatment effect heterogeneity as in Crump et al. (2008). The first (second) is testing whether facing a selected person has a 
zero (an identical) average effect for highly and less self-confident subjects. 




   36 
 
Table A8: Performance Evaluations by Absolute Self-Confidence (Robustness Check) 
                             
    First switching point in EUR  Average switching point in EUR 




c)  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low 
                        
Man  Mean  9.30  6.23  7.75  7.31  9.30  6.30  7.38  7.44 
  (Std.err.)  (0.87)  (0.62)  (0.70)  (0.87)  (0.87)  (0.54)  (0.72)  (0.66) 
  Median  9.2  5.6  8.4  6.8  9.2  6.2  8.0  6.8 
  Obs.  16  7  8  11  16  8  9  15 
                        
Selected-  Mean  7.05  6.29  5.45  5.18  7.32  6.68  5.74  5.18 
Woman  (Std.err.)  (0.48)  (0.93)  (0.60)  (0.76)  (0.54)  (0.85)  (0.59)  (0.65) 
  Median  7.6  5.8  4.8  4.4  7.6  7.8  4.8  4.2 
  Obs.  32  14  21  18  33  16  23  22 
                        
Difference in means 
a)  3.29**  -0.28  2.03**  2.47*  3.29**  -0.47  1.25  2.53** 
  [p-value]  [.02]  [.97]  [.04]  [.08]  [.05]  [.77]  [.12]  [.02] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=4.96[.08]*  χ
2(2)=9.71[.01]**  χ






2(1)=2.68 [.10]*  χ
2(1)=0.22[.64] 
                        
                             
Neutral   Mean  8.13  7.80  8.82  8.24  7.98  8.23  8.68  8.31 
  (Std.err.)  (0.49)  (0.31)  (0.91)  (0.73)  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.79)  (0.70) 
  Median  7.8  7.8  9.6  8.4  7.6  8.0  9.0  8.4 
  Obs.  24  6  17  15  25  7  20  18 
                        
Selected-
Neutral  Mean  7.06  6.90  6.08  4.80  7.06  7.11  6.62  5.50 
  (Std.err.)  (0.59)  (2.16)  (0.65)  (0.56)  (0.59)  (1.92)  (0.75)  (0.64) 
  Median  6.8  5.6  6.4  4.6  6.8  7.6  6.8  4.8 
  Obs.  26  8  10  18  26  9  13  21 
                             
Difference in means 
a)  0.63  1.63  3.52**  3.47**  0.63  1.70  2.84*  2.97** 
  [p-value]  [.17]  [.73]  [.04]  [.00]  [.24]  [.63]  [.08]  [.01] 
Zero ATE 
b)    χ
2(2)=2.08 [.35]  χ
2(2)=19.92[.00]**  χ




2(1)=0.01 [.94]  χ
2(1)=0.23[.63]  χ
2(1)=0.01 [.93]  χ
2(1)=0.26[.61] 
                             
                   
** (*): Difference is significant on the 5 (10) percent level. p-values in brackets. 
a: Two-sided t test.       
b: Tests for treatment effect heterogeneity as in Crump et al. (2008). The first (second) is testing whether facing a selected person has a 
zero (an identical) average effect for highly and less self-confident subjects. 
c: Self-confidence is high (low) if the subjects believes he/she is a top performer himself/herself.     
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Table A9: Regression Analyses of Performance Evaluations by Relative Level of Self-Confidence for 
Switching Point (One-Time Switchers Only) 
  Switching Point 
Subjects:  Male  Female  All 
Non-select TM * Gender TM * Self-confident * Male      4.06** 
(1.62) 
Non-select TM * Self-confident * Male      -.43 
(1.86) 
Gender TM * Self-confident * Male      2.33 
(1.78) 
Non-select TM * Male      -2.30* 
(1.21) 
Gender TM * Male      -1.63 
(1.20) 
Self-confident * Male      -1.49 
(1.45) 


















Male      2.28** 
(1.04) 






























Obs.  108  96  204 
R squared  .25  .29  .24 
Estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). Non-select TM 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the treatments Man and Neutral, and zero otherwise. Gender TM is a dummy that equals one 
for the gendered treatments Man and Selected-Woman. Self-confidence is a dummy equal to one if the belief about the own MRT 
score is above the median belief by gender. 38 
 
Table A10: Regression Analysis of Performance Evaluations by Relative Level of Self-Confidence 
for Average Switching Point 
  Average Switching Point 
Subjects:  Male  Female  All 
Non-select TM * Gender TM * Self-confident * Male      3.95** 
(1.59) 
Non-select TM * Self-confident * Male      .13 
(1.66) 
Gender TM * Self-confident * Male      2.08 
(1.60) 
Non-select TM * Male      -2.12** 
(1.07) 
Gender TM * Male      -1.17 
(1.06) 
Self-confident * Male      -1.79 
(1.31) 


















Male      2.02** 
(.95) 






























Obs.  113  116  229 
R squared  .24  .24  .20 
Estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). Non-select TM 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the treatments Man and Neutral, and zero otherwise. Gender TM is a dummy that equals one 
for the gendered treatments Man and Selected-Woman. Self-confidence is a dummy equal to one if the belief about the own MRT 
score is above the median belief by gender. 